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27Collaboration and Coercion:
Domestic Violence Meets Collaborative Law
—
Margaret B. Drew*
‘Collaboration and Coercion’ addresses the systemic and individual concerns 
that arise when family members that have experienced abuse enter into the 
collaborative law process. A form of alternative dispute resolution, collaborative 
law is a method of resolving disputes without engagement of the legal system. The 
author addresses the structural and cultural difficulties that survivors of abuse 
encounter throughout the process as well as the ethical concerns that are raised 
when collaborative practitioners accept cases where the parties have a history of 
coercion within the intimate relationship.
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i. introduction
Like other courts, family courts focus much effort on the pre-trial resolution 
of cases.1 A common perspective of family court judges is that it is easier for 
shattered families to repair and thrive if the parties reach agreement outside 
of the trial process.2 Many also theorise that when parties reach resolution 
in a respectful and reasonable manner, client satisfaction with the resulting 
agreement is likely.3
Most family courts have offered alternative methods of dispute resolution 
for several decades.4 Mediation, as well as court-provided negotiation 
assistance, are staple examples of some mechanisms used to reach settle-
ment in family law cases.
Collaborative law is an alternative method of dispute resolution that has 
added a different approach to settlement. While the method can be appli-
cable in all types of litigation, the process is implemented primarily with 
family law cases.5
 ‘Collaboration and Coercion’ discusses the dynamics of abuse. This 
article is intended to be a primer on the dynamics of intimate partner violence 
as well as an introduction to the concerns of domestic violence practitioners 
when those who have experienced abuse are drawn into the collaborative 
process. The dynamics discussion is comprehensive because those who 
advocate on behalf of clients who have been abused are most alarmed about 
systems actors6 who do not understand intimate partner abuse. This leaves 
those systems actors unqualified to assess whether abuse exists in an intimate 
partner relationship. The role of professionals involved in the collaborative 
process and their response to the parties who have lived in abusive partner-
ships is explored along with the dangers of using alternative dispute resolu-
* Margaret Drew is a domestic violence expert who, during the 2011-2012 academic year, was 
Visiting Professor of Clinical Instruction at the University of Alabama School of Law. Professor 
Drew is grateful for the support of the Schott Foundation of the University of Cincinnati College of 
Law and her colleagues at the College and the University of Alabama School of Law who gener-
ously offered advice as the article was in development. She thanks her research assistants, along 
with Professor Robin Runge, and the panel members who critiqued an earlier draft as part of the 
2011 NYU Clinical Writer’s Conference. 
1. Christy L Hendricks, ‘The Trend Toward Mandatory Mediation in Custody and Visitation 
Disputes of Minor Children: An Overview’ (1993-1994) 32 University of Louisville Journal of Family 
Law 491, 492-93.
2. cf Joan S Meier, ‘Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding 
Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions’ (2003) 11 American University Journal of Gender, 
Social Policy & the Law 657, 693 (noting one judge’s advocacy for settlement and desire to de- 
escalate tensions between conflicting parties).
3. See example, Pauline H Tesler, ‘Collaborative Family Law’ (2004) 4 Pepperdine Dispute 
Resolution Law Journal 317, 325.
4. Mediation for family law cases has been offered in some jurisdictions since the 1970s. Ann 
Milne, ‘Mediation – A Promising Alternative for Family Courts’ (1991) 42(2) Juvenile and Family 
Court Journal 61, 62.
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5. See generally, Gary L Voegele, Linda K Wray, and Ronald D Ousky, ‘Collaborative Law: A Useful 
Tool for the Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes’ (2007) 33 William Mitchell Law 
Review 971, 974-75 (discussing the inception and prevalence of collaborative law in family law).
6. The term ‘systems actors’ refers to those involved in legal processes and institutions. This 
includes lawyers, judges, and those who support them, such as court personnel, mental health 
advisors, and other advisors. 
7. Tesler, ‘Collaborative Family Law’ (n 3) 331. 
8. ibid.
9. ibid.
tion processes in the context of abusive relationships. The history of chal-
lenges to using the mediation process to resolve disputes between an abuser 
and the target of the abuse is included in order to provide historical context 
as well as guidance to those new to the collaborative dispute resolution 
process.
ii. collaborative law theory and process
The collaborative method of resolving family law conflicts is a rational and 
appealing one. During the collaborative process, disputing parties and their 
attorneys participate in frequent negotiation sessions. With narrow excep-
tions, counsel works outside of the litigation process. The parties and counsel 
may work with a shared ‘team’ of professionals, ranging from therapists to 
financial planners. The collaborative team assists the parties by offering 
advice and information with the hope that an amicable settlement will be 
reached. One desired outcome of the collaborative process is to reduce 
hostility between the separating partners. This can be accomplished in many 
ways, but one key method is having each party feel meaningfully ‘heard’ by 
the other side. Once reasonable communication is established, the ideal 
outcome is for the parties to reach a mutually beneficial agreement assisted 
by coaches, legal and financial advisors, and other professionals whose input 
assists the couple in making informed decisions.7 The parties accomplish 
resolution in large part by meeting face-to-face in a series of negotiations. 
The parties are given ample opportunity to consult with their separate legal 
advisors, who in turn consult with other members of the collaborative team. 
In this regard, the team, ideally trained in the ‘psychodynamics of divorce 
and healthy family restructuring’,8 is invited to consider the best interests 
of not only the individual parties but of the family as a unit as well.9 While 
some collaborative practices might differ in structure, most utilise much of 
the process described above, and all incorporate face-to-face meetings into 
the basic process.
While many family law practitioners champion the collaborative process 
as unique and innovative, the use of frequent face-to-face meetings in 
accomplishing a result in which all parties will be invested is not unique to 
collaborative lawyering. A comparable process was promoted in the early 
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1980s by Phillip Harter for negotiations with government agencies. That 
process is known as regulation by negotiation.10 ‘Early and continuous ne-
gotiations among ... affected interests ... and unanimous consent to the final 
negotiated rule proposal’ have been identified as key process characteristics 
of regulation by negotiation.11 In addition, like the collaborative process, 
alternative resolution methods are available for those not participating in 
the negotiation process.12
However, collaborative law practice imposes a burden not proscribed in 
the regulation by negotiation process. Should the collaborative process fail, 
the parties must engage successor counsel if they desire ongoing represen-
tation. Collaborative practice dictates that counsel’s contract with the client 
states that, other than in emergency situations, the collaborative attorney 
will not file an appearance on behalf of the client in any ensuing, related 
litigation.13 Some maintain that this provision is neither necessary nor desir-
able.14
Numerous sources discuss the varied ingredients of the collaborative 
process.15 Authors agree, however, that a primary underlying assumption in 
the collaborative approach is that the parties will be transparent in their 
discussions and disclosures.16 Good faith is a necessity in the collaborative 
law process because collaborative lawyers do not engage in the court’s formal 
discovery process and, therefore, neither the lawyers nor the clients are 
subject to the attendant sanctions for non-disclosure.
Without an understanding of domestic violence dynamics, the risks created 
by the collaborative process may not be apparent.
10. Andrew P Morriss, Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak, Regulation By Litigation (Yale University 
Press 2009) 43-44. This process was developed at approximately the same time that Stuart Webb 
introduced the collaborative model as a method of resolving private legal disputes. See generally, 
Stu Webb, ‘Collaborative Law: A Practitioner’s Perspective on its History and Current Practice’ 
(2008) 21 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 155, 155–57 (both authors 
advocating models of dispute resolution that would encourage reasonable discussion and avoid 
entrenchment of positions).
11. Andrew P Morriss, Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak, Regulation By Litigation (Yale University 
Press 2009) 44.
12. ibid.
13. Ted Schneyer, ‘The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in Pro-
fessional Change’ (2008) 50 Arizona Law Review 289, 290-91.
14. Cooperative law is a similar process but permits counsel to continue to represent the client 
in any subsequent related litigation. John Lande, ‘Recommendation for Collaborative Law Groups 
to Encourage Members to Offer Cooperative Law in Addition to Collaborative Law’ [2007] <http://
law.missouri.edu/lande/publications/lande%20cooperative%20law%20policy.pdf> accessed 13 
June 2012.
15. See examples: Nancy Ver Steegh, ‘The Uniform Collaborative Law Act and Intimate Partner 
Violence: A Roadmap for Collaborative (and Non- Collaborative) Lawyers’ (2009) 38 Hofstra Law 
Review 699; Uniform Collaborative Law Act [2010] <http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.
aspx?title=Collaborative%20Law%20Act> accessed 13 June 2012.
16. Forthright disclosure is a fundamental tenet of collaborative practice. Sheila M Gutterman, 
‘Collaborative Family Law—Part II’ (2001) 30(12) The Colorado Lawyer 57, 57.
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17. The term ‘target’ is used by the author to identify the individual who in other writings may 
be referred to as the ‘survivor’ or the ‘victim’. The author prefers the term ‘target’ as it draws attention 
to the exclusive focus of abuse that many partners bring to their coercive actions. Often it is difficult 
for those unfamiliar with domestic violence to understand that the abusive partner may not exhibit 
any signs of violence other than when he is alone with the intimate partner. Others have found the 
term  ‘target’ useful as part of the discussion of the dynamics of abuse. See further, Mary Ann Dutton 
and Lisa A Goodman, ‘Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward a New Conceptualization’ 
(2005) 52 Sex Roles: A Journal of Research 743.
18. Nina W Tarr, ‘Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?’ (2003) 11 Washington 
University Journal of Law and Policy 157, 160-63.
19. For example, in Bradley v State, a ruling that stood for almost seventy years, the Court held 
that a husband should be permitted to exercise the right to chastise his wife without being subjected 
to ‘vexatious prosecution’. Bradley v State 1 Miss 156, 158 (1824).
20. Leslye E Orloff and others, ‘Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help and 
Police Response’ (2003) 13 UCLA Women’s Law Journal 43, 52.
21. ibid; Sally F Goldfarb, ‘Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law 
Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?’ (2008) 29 Cardozo Law Review 1487, 1494.
22. Cheryl Hanna, ‘No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1849, 1857.
iii. understanding the dynamics of domestic abuse
—
A. The Origin and Differing Applications of the Phrase ‘Domestic Violence’
In using ‘violence’ as a defining term, the phrase ‘domestic violence’ is 
misleading. The listener might believe that physical violence is a necessary 
component of abuse since, in our legal culture, violence is so often associ-
ated with physical acts. In reality, a coercive partner’s acts of control over 
an intimate partner expand far beyond those that are merely physical.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the phrase was popularised in order to both 
define what was seen as the worse abuses of women and to promote change 
in the laws that defined violent criminal acts. During the decades that pre-
ceded the 1970s, virtually no legal protections for targets17 of intimate partner 
violence existed.18
Those statutes, like assault and battery, that could have formed the basis 
for arrest, were not enforced in the context of marriage or dating relation-
ships.19 However, from the inception of the domestic violence movement, 
the overarching goal of targets and their lawyers has been the target’s safety.
Early in the domestic violence movement, particular focus was given to 
the lack of any meaningful law enforcement response. Battered women who 
called the police often received no assistance.20 When police were dispatched 
to the scene, the women were mostly told that theirs was a private dispute 
and that the police could not intervene.21 When police did take action, often 
it was only to tell the coercive partner ‘to “take a walk around the block”’.22
Yet violence outside of the intimate relationship context was a concept 
that both the police and the criminal court actors did understand. With a 
focus on state intervention, particularly in the criminal context, the term 
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23. Examples include California Penal Code      243(e)(1) (West 2008), which sets a higher maximum 
sentence for battery in a domestic context and Massachusetts General Laws Annotated ch 209A    6 
(West 2007), which establishes mandatory and preferred arrest policies for domestic disputes. Emily 
J Sack, however, discusses the criticism of mandatory arrest policies and how they might negatively 
affect domestic violence targets. Emily J Sack, ‘Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the 
Future of Domestic Violence Policy’ [2004] Wisconsin Law Review 1657, 1676-80.
24. See example, Ohio Revised Code Annotated    3113.31 (West 2005). 
25. See example, Alaska Statutes    18.66.100 (2008).
26. See example, North Dakota Century Code    14.07.1–03 (2009).
27. See example, ibid; See also, Massachusetts General Laws Sec. 209A(4). 
28. Jacquelyn Campbell and others, ‘Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results 
from a Multisite Case Control Study’ (1993) 93 American Journal of Public Health 1089, 1091. 
‘domestic violence’ proved effective in expanding the recognition of violence 
against women. By incorporating reference to violent behaviour, the term 
‘domestic violence’ used language easily understood and adopted by those 
with the authority to arrest and prosecute. Given the many resulting crimi-
nal statutes and practices that have been enacted, including enhanced 
penalties for domestic violence and mandatory or preferred arrest policies,23 
the domestic violence movement unarguably effected change.
Unfortunately, focusing on the criminal justice system and the language 
of violence misled those unfamiliar with the dynamics of abuse to assume 
that only those situations involving criminally defined physical violence 
were credible domestic violence cases. Indeed, many civil protection order 
statutes continue to require physical violence or a serious threat of physical 
violence as elements to be proved before a petition can be granted.24
Even more problematic are statutes that incorporate the criminal defini-
tion of domestic violence into their civil protection order scheme.25 Such laws 
uniformly require serious physical harm or the threat of serious physical 
harm as a prerequisite to the issuance of an emergency order of protection.26 
The imminent harm or immediate harm standard that is needed to obtain 
an emergency order often focuses on recent acts of serious physical harm 
or threats of serious physical harm.27 What domestic violence lawyers and 
researchers recognise, and which may not be readily apparent to others, is 
that non-physical acts of control are often the precursors, and in some cases 
predictors, of serious physical harm or death. A leading group of researchers, 
led by Jackie Campbell, reported that in a study of women killed by an inti-
mate partner, only 70% overall had reported prior physical violence by that 
partner.28 Traditional criminal standards of violence do not accommodate 
the coercive dynamics of domestic violence that extend far beyond acts of 
physical harm.
Financial, emotional, verbal, mental, and sexual control are broadly 
incorporated into contemporary definitions of domestic violence. Coercive 
control is a comprehensive and more appropriate term for what has tradition-
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29. See generally, Evan Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 276-77 (explaining the dynamics of coercive control).
30. Jeffrey R Baker, ‘Enjoining Coercion: Squaring the Civil Protection Orders with the Reality 
of Domestic Abuse’ (2008) 11 Journal of Law & Family Studies 35, 65.
31. See example, Stacy Moore, ‘Family say courts shut down restraining orders’ Hi-Desert Star 
(California, 3 February 2010) <http://www.hidesertstar.com/articles/2010/02/03/news/
doc4b69381ed5e05699313614.txt> accessed 13 June 2012.
ally been called domestic violence.29 Judges, prosecutors, and domestic vio-
lence lawyers can have vastly differing definitions of domestic violence as 
a term of art, perpetuating the frustrations that erupt when targets that have 
not been physically abused are denied legal protections. It is not surprising 
then when, for example, a petitioner is denied protection after she argues 
that non-physical forms of control, such as isolation from friends and family, 
have escalated and that she fears some impending serious injury will occur 
next. Judges, police, and other members of the justice system do not always 
understand that there is an increased level of risk to a target when coercive 
tactics escalate, whether the tactics are physically violent or not. Indeed, a 
court might not recognise a valid domestic violence claim because the judge 
does not perceive a claim without allegations of physical abuse as authentic, 
let alone dangerous. When domestic violence lawyers use the phrase ‘do-
mestic violence’, they include in that definition any behaviour that is designed 
to control the intimate partner. Often those lawyers fail to adequately explain 
to the court why their expanded definition of abuse includes non-physically 
violent acts. If judges understood that physical violence is just one of many 
coercive tools in the abuser’s satchel, outcomes could be vastly different. 
Some maintain that domestic abuse does not arise from physical violence, 
but rather that  ‘physical violence is a manifestation of oppressive power and 
control dynamics within the abusive relationship’.30 Consequently, a judge 
who does not understand the nature of intimate partner abuse, who reads a 
protection order petition that is devoid of allegations of physical abuse, may 
see the petitioner not only as not credible but also as ‘abusing the system’.31 
This misunderstanding of what places abused partners at risk permeates 
all who enter into the lives of abused women and men. Lawyers, therapists, 
friends, and family all have a role in perpetuating the myth that a woman’s 
risk is tied to physical abuse. This misunderstanding leads to negative con-
sequences in any setting where battered women must interact with those 
who remain uneducated on the dynamics of abuse.
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B. Dynamics of Coercive Control
Many women have been killed where there was no known history of prior 
physical violence.32 While best practice would be for civil protection order 
statutes to be amended to include non-physical forms of control,33 many 
statutes would be effective as drafted if civil lawyers and judges understood 
that the non-coercive tactics are inherently threats of serious physical harm.
Coercive partners34 typically use only as many coercive tactics as are 
necessary to control the target;35 if limiting the at-risk partner’s access to 
financial resources or preventing her from working outside of the home have 
been successful in controlling her behaviour, then there may be no need to 
escalate tactics to other forms of control.36 Similarly, one act of physical 
violence early in the relationship gives credibility to future threats,37 such 
that threats alone may be sufficient from that day forward in maintaining 
control over the targeted partner.38
The collaborative practitioner may be unaware of the dynamics of coer-
cive control. Historically, neither law schools nor social work schools have 
required domestic violence study as part of the curriculum for those intend-
ing to practice in the family arena. Bar examinations rarely test on the subject 
matter, even when family law is one of the examined topics.39 Even jurisdic-
tions that endow specialty certificates on family law practitioners regularly 
fail to test the practitioner’s understanding of coercive control.
In both therapeutic and legal counselling, one may counsel those in 
abusive relationships without any formal training in coercive control. While 
32. See generally, Campbell (n 28) 1089-97 (outlining research findings showing cases where 
abusers with no prior history of spousal violence had killed their wife).
33. Jeffrey R Baker suggests a definition that would incorporate the use of coercion intended to 
control the behaviour of an intimate partner as grounds for relief under the protection order scheme. 
Baker (n 30) 59. Missouri recently amended its statute to incorporate coercive behaviour as abuse: 
‘“[c]oercion”, compelling another by force or threat of force to engage in conduct from which the 
latter has a right to abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the person has a right to engage’. 
Missouri Revised Statutes, Chapter 455.010(c) (2011).
34. Those who harm in intimate partner relationships are referred to in many ways. Common 
terms are abuser, batterer, or abusive partner. Likewise, the partner who suffers harm is referenced 
in various ways, such as survivor, victim, or target.
35. See generally, Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (n 29) 214-16 
(enumerating the various control tactics that coercive partners may employ to assert control over 
the target); See also, Dutton (n 17) 743.
36. Dutton (n 17) 749.
37. ibid 748.
38. ibid.
39. cf Sara M Buel, ‘The Pedagogy of Domestic Violence Law: Situating Domestic Violence Work 
in Law Schools, Adding the Lenses of Race and Class’ (2003) 11 American University Journal of 
Gender, Social Policy & the Law 309, 311-12 (noting that some states were starting to add domestic 
violence questions on the bar exam, but identified the new trend as only in ‘several states’).
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lack of formal academic study does not preclude the delivery of effective 
services, the lack of such training is obviously not optimal nor in the best 
interests of the clients. Since the behaviour of domestic violence targets is 
often described as counter-intuitive,40 a lack of appreciation of the funda-
mental dynamics of violence can create misunderstanding between practi-
tioners and their target-clients. Any resulting increase in the client’s safety 
risk can further frustrate and disempower the abused partner.
Safety is the lens through which competent domestic violence services 
are provided. The target’s counter-intuitive behaviour may seem unusual 
or bizarre to the untrained practitioner. Yet the behaviour may be effective 
safety planning for the target and her children. For example, the untrained 
observer might see an abused woman as ‘weak’ when she returns to her 
sexually coercive partner after obtaining an emergency civil protection order. 
However, if the coercive partner threatens to focus future abuse on the 
parties’ daughter instead of the mother should the mother proceed with a 
no-contact order, the mother’s decision becomes understandable. Return 
to the coercive partner is particularly understandable in a jurisdiction where 
the coercive parent is likely to be awarded unrestricted access to the daugh-
ter if the mother cannot prove in court that the coercive father has directly 
abused the child.41 By returning home and terminating the protection order, 
the mother has executed what she believes is the best safety plan for the 
child. An outside observer might see only that the mother has failed to follow 
through on the ‘protections’ offered by the court system. Targets make what 
they believe to be reasonable choices in their circumstances. These choices 
can be appreciated only when safety is understood as the primary decision-
making influence.
Only familiarity with the dynamics of coercion and the range of target 
responses to that coercion can prepare collaborative and other professionals 
for effective assessment of abuse cases.42
40. Jennifer Gentile Long, ‘Explaining Counterintuitive Victim Behavior in Domestic Violence 
and Sexual Assault Cases’ (2006) 1(4) The Voice <http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/the_voice_vol_1_
no_4_2006.pdf> accessed 30 June 2012.
41. See further, Lundy Bancroft and Jay G Silverman, The Batterer as Parent: Addressing the Impact 
of Domestic Violence on Family Dynamics (Sage Publications 2002) 115-16.
42. Many screening tools are available. For example, the American Bar Association Commission 
on Domestic and Sexual Violence published a screening tool for attorneys that can be downloaded 
from its website <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/screening 
toolcdv.authcheckdam.pdf>; See generally, Ver Steegh, ‘The Uniform Collaborative Law Act and 
Intimate Partner Violence: A Roadmap for Collaborative (and Non-Collaborative) Lawyers’ (n 15) 
712-13 (providing an expanded discussion of the types of violence that attorneys must be familiar 
with).
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C. Abuser Manipulation
The coercive partner will employ any tool available to enhance control over 
the target.43 This includes manipulation of systems and professionals. Family 
systems therapy provides an example of professional settings that unwit-
tingly support the abusive intimate partner’s coercive behaviour.44 Family 
systems therapy encourages participants to explore and adjust whatever 
roles each family member plays in contributing to the problems in the pre-
senting relationship.45 Therapy sessions may include partners, children, and 
other family members as well. However, since disclosure of abuse can place 
the target at greater risk, neither abused women nor abused children are 
likely to disclose the coercive behaviour in the presence of the coercive 
partner. Disclosure is especially unlikely in any professional setting where 
the abuser has access to the target’s information. Likewise, accountability 
is discouraged in a setting where resolution is the priority. The lack of 
accountability for coercive behaviour that resulted in great harm to the family 
undermines the target’s ability to achieve safety. This scenario is played out 
time and again where professionals prioritise conflict resolution over safety.
D. Understanding the Target’s Response
There is no uniform, predictable response to trauma.46 Some targets will be 
angry, verbally aggressive, and demanding. Some may have fought back, 
while others are passive and quiet. While many people believe that they can 
identify who is an abuser and who is a target, no psychological test can assess 
who abuses or diagnose who is being abused.47 Individuals as well as systems 
frequently judge target credibility by whether she responds to abuse in their 
expected way.48 For example, observers might expect a ‘true victim’ or target 
to be fearful and grateful.49 The woman who is assertive and who has fought 
back may be judged as not credible.50 Lawyers and other professionals may 
43. Dutton (n 17) 743.
44. Lynn Scoresby, ‘Family Systems Therapy’ (1979) 5 Journal of the Association of Mormon 
Counselors and Psychotherapists 24, 27.
45. ibid.
46. See generally, Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political 
Terror (Basic Books 2001) 86-95 (providing an overview of the various responses to trauma that 
survivors may experience).
47. Clare Dalton, Leslie M Drozd, and Frances QF Wong, Navigating Custody & Visitation 
Evaluations in Cases with Domestic Violence: A Judge’s Guide (Bench Guide, National Council of Juve-
nile and Family Court Judges, 2006) 19-21.
48. Gentile Long (n 40).
49. Leigh Goodmark, ‘When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights 
Back’(2008) 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 75, 82-83.
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make similar judgements. Once this judgement is made, the target may be 
seen as resistant, obstructionist, or alienating when in fact her behaviour is 
a rational response to abuse and the resulting concern for her and her chil-
dren’s safety.51 In a recent study, some mediators noted that ‘the intractable 
position of one party may be justified by reasonable fears’.52 Unfortunately, 
in the same study mediators noted only cases involving physical abuse as 
inappropriate for mediation.
E. Abuser Accountability
The known method of reducing or eliminating abusive behaviour is for the 
coercive partner to take accountability of his actions and receive appropriate 
re-education.53 Accountability is the essential goal of successful batterer 
intervention programmes.54 Unsurprisingly, taking responsibility is also the 
part of treatment that a coercive partner resists most.55 Coercive partners 
routinely normalise their own behaviour and the impact of their abuse on 
others.56  Crying and saying ‘I’m sorry’ come easily to many coercive partners,57 
while sincerity and a commitment to change do not. While professionals 
acknowledge the power of apology, a coercive partner’s apology without 
treatment and change is no apology at all: it is manipulation.58
When third parties persuade a target to ‘forgive’ the apologetic but abusive 
intimate partner, they place the target in greater jeopardy.59 From the target’s 
perspective, the coercive partner has manipulated third parties into sup-
porting his position and making himself the focus of their sympathy.60 These 
well-meaning individuals may believe that they are encouraging family 
healing, but the result is that the targeted partner feels pressured into resum-
ing a relationship with the coercive partner. The accomplishment of  ‘forgive-
ness’ or reconciliation results in the untreated coercive partner regaining 
unfettered access to the target.61 The target’s ‘lesson learned’ is that even 
50. ibid 94-95.
51. See further, Meier (n 2) 711-12.
52. Sandra J Perry, Tanya M Marcum, and Charles R Stoner, ‘Stumbling Down the Courthouse 
Steps: Mediators’ Perceptions of the Stumbling Blocks to Successful Mandated Mediation in Child 
Custody and Visitation’ (2011) 11 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 441, 460.
53. Amanda Dekki, ‘Punishment or Rehabilitation? The Case for State-Mandated Guidelines for 
Batterer Intervention Programs in Domestic Violence Cases’ (2004) 18 St John’s Journal of Legal 
Commentary 549, 568-72.
54. ibid.
55. Jane H Wolf-Smith and Ralph LaRossa, ‘After He Hits Her’ (1992) 41 Family Relations 324, 
325.
56. ibid 324. 
57. ibid 326. 
58. ibid 327.
59. ibid 328.
60. David Island and Patrick Letellier, Men Who Beat the Men Who Love Them: Battered Gay Men 
and Domestic Violence (The Haworth Press 1991) 256.
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those that she turned to for help and understanding have been co-opted by 
the coercive partner.62 This scenario plays out in the collaborative process 
when the target is expected to set aside abuse concerns in order to conduct 
‘respectful’ negotiations.
What many Alternative Dispute Resolution (‘ADR’) practitioners fail to 
accept is that the decision to abuse is deeply engrained in the essence of the 
coercive partner’s belief system.63 The coercive partner feels entitled and 
privileged.64 While control tactics might change, once the coercive partner 
locks onto a target, his abusive behaviour is unlikely to diminish without 
appropriate intervention or his voluntary re-shifting of focus to a new partner.65
Given coercive partners’ resistance to change and to treatment, inviting 
couples that have experienced abuse into the collaborative process is danger-
ous.
iv. the domestic violence practitioner’s concerns regarding 
the collaborative practice
—
A. The Domestic Violence Practitioner’s View
Because of their understanding of the dynamics of abuse, competent do-
mestic violence lawyers66 approach alternative dispute processes with great 
caution. Generally, targets’ lawyers oppose any process that places the parties 
in close physical proximity, specifically in situations where there is either 
fear or a power imbalance present. Domestic violence lawyers appreciate 
that any process can become a tool of a coercive partner in maintaining 
control over a target. Those lawyers have particular concerns regarding ADR 
in the domestic violence context because the target may be left without the 
protections available through the courts.67 As with mediation, domestic vio-
lence lawyers fear that the collaborative process will permit a coercive partner 
61. ibid.
62. Kara Bellew, ‘Silent Suffering: Uncovering and Understanding Domestic Violence in Affluent 
Communities’ (2005) 26 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 39, 47-48.
63. Island (n 60) 67, 73.
64. ibid 76-77.
65. ibid 77.
66. In the context of this article, ‘domestic violence’ lawyers are those experienced in handling 
cases involving coercive control and who understand the dynamics of abusive relationships.
67. Throughout this paper, the target is referred to as ‘she’ and the coercive partner as ‘he’. This 
is as statistically, in heterosexual relationships, the male is the predominate aggressor and the female 
is the target and the at-risk partner, but this pattern is sometimes inverse. Stark, Coercive Control: 
How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (n 29) 91. The same dynamics of abuse can be present in 
same sex-relationships. Island (n 60) 16. Abuse in same-sex relationships is a serious concern and 
there is evidence that intimate partner coercion occurs at the same rate in same-sex relationships 
as in different-sex relationships. Joanna Bunker Rohrbaugh, ‘Domestic Violence In Same-Gender 
Relationships’ (2006) 44 Family Court Review 287, 287-88. 
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to manipulate the professional participants into allying with his position to 
the detriment of the partner who was abused.68 Not only do the collaborative 
and mediation processes presume that the parties will participate in good 
faith and be transparent,69 both processes further assume that the participants 
are fundamentally reasonable people who can reach agreement if properly 
guided.70 
Lawyers who represent targets of intimate partner abuse appreciate that 
in most instances the abusive party holds deeply ingrained negative views 
of women based on gender stereotypes, and that these views are a significant 
part of the coercive partner’s psyche and belief system.71 These lawyers view 
collaborative law professionals as naïve in their belief that the process itself 
will somehow rectify any power imbalance or change a coercive partner’s 
women-diminishing beliefs. Such naivety might lead to frustration on the 
part of the collaborative practitioner who does not understand the inflexibil-
ity of one or both of the parties. This misguided interpretation of client be-
haviour can result in target blaming, which ultimately empowers the coercive 
partner and places the target at even greater risk. By attempting to employ 
the collaborative process in resolving disputes that originate in coercive 
relationships, professionals can manufacture outcomes for clients far worse 
than any simple failure of the collaborative process itself might have produced 
in non-abuse cases. Collaborative practice is the shoe that does not quite fit 
when cases involving intimate partner coercion are forced into the model.
B. Lessons from the Mediation Experience
Collaborative law proponents readily point out the differences between the 
collaborative process and mediation. The collaborative process has many 
client protections incorporated into the practice that are not routine in 
mediation.72 For example, the parties have their lawyers present during the 
collaborative meetings.73 Not all mediation models permit or require active 
participation by counsel.74
68. See generally, Joan Zorza, ‘What is Wrong with Mediation’ (2004) 9 Domestic Violence Report 
81, 94 (describing the various ways in which the coercive partner manipulates the mediation process).
69. Douglas C Reynolds and Doris F Tennant, ‘Collaborative Law—An Emerging Practice’ (2001) 
45(5) Boston Bar Journal 12, 12.
70. See further, Pauline H Tesler, Collaborative Law: Achieving Effective Resolution in Divorce 
Without Litigation (American Bar Association 2003) 16; See also, Susan L Pollet, ‘Mediating 
Domestic Violence: A Potentially Dangerous Tool’ (2005) 77 New York State Bar Association 42, 43.
71. Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (n 29) 213-14.
72. Tesler, ‘Collaborative Family Law’(n 3) 329-30.
73. ibid 328.
74. See example, Sarah E Cole, Mediation: Law, Policy & Practice (3rd edn, West 2011) para 12:2 
(noting that lawyers do not often participate in divorce mediation programs).
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Regular and persistent meetings are required as part of the collaborative 
process, with the goal being to continue meeting until the parties have 
resolved their differences.75 While mediation can require frequent meetings 
as well, mediators sometimes do not permit third parties to be in the room 
during sessions; nor are teams of interdisciplinary professionals part of 
mediation models.76 For participants who already feel less powerful than 
the other party, the lack of counsel or some other support system within 
mediation can result in further disempowerment, mitigated only by the 
sensitivity and skill of the mediator.77
The enhancement of the imbalance of power to the detriment of the target 
in mediation and in other settings has been the primary concern of domes-
tic violence lawyers in opposing ADR schemes. Both the American Bar 
Association ( ‘ABA’) and the American National Council of Juvenile and 
Family Court Judges have voiced concerns about the use of mediation in 
cases involving abuse.78 For this reason, ABA policy recommends an ‘opt 
out’ provision from court-ordered mediation for those who have experienced 
abuse.79 The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges suggest 
safety guidelines for courts that require or recommend mediation in family 
law cases where abuse may be present.80
Professional mediators and others often cite only the risks to the target’s 
physical safety during a session as a matter of concern. The risk of on-going 
physical abuse is certainly not to be discounted. However, many mediators 
do not employ any effective safety measures. Simple steps such as having 
the target arrive fifteen minutes after the coercive partner or leave fifteen 
minutes earlier can enhance her physical safety. That said, there is no doubt 
that access to the target during mediation sessions, at child visitation ex-
changes, and at other times, increase the target’s risk of further abuse: 
physical and/or otherwise.81
75. Tesler, ‘Collaborative Family Law’ (n 3) 328, 330.
76. ibid 318.
77. See generally, Nancy Thoennes, Peter Salem, and Jessica Pearson, ‘Mediation & Domestic 
Violence’ (2005) 33 Family Court Review 6, 9 (noting the importance of ensuring that the mediation 
process protects the safety of abused women).
78. Linda K Girdner, ‘Mediation’ in Deborah M Goelman, Fredrica L Leherman, and Roberta L 
Valente (eds), The Impact of Mediation on Your Legal Practice (2nd edn, American Bar Association 
1996) 4-17.
79. Jane C Murphy and Robert Rubinson, ‘Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding to the 
Challenges of Crafting Effective Screens’ (2005) 39 Family Law Quarterly 53, 60 fn 45 (quoting the 
following ABA resolution: ‘[t]hat the American Bar Association recommends that court-mandated 
mediation include an opt-out prerogative in any action in which one party has perpetrated domes-
tic violence upon the other party’).
80. Girdner (n 78) 4-17.
81. See generally, Joan Zorza, ‘Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs 
of Battered Women’ (1995) 29 Family Law Quarterly 273, 274-75 (noting that the safety risk of the 
target often increases after the target has left the coercive partner).
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Collaborative lawyers cite the presence of others in the room during 
negotiations as resolving the safety issue for the target.82 While the presence 
of others can be protective, the possibility of physical attack is not at the 
heart of the domestic violence lawyer’s objections to either mediation or to 
the collaborative process. Concerns centre on the emotional and mental 
vulnerability of a target that can result from direct communication with her 
abuser.83
Some neutrals84 believe that any agreement is preferable to a litigated 
result. When agreement is the exclusive goal, ADR professionals might 
unknowingly exert pressure on the less powerful party to make more and 
more concessions.85 Since coercive partners can be rigid in both their views 
and decision-making,86 it is then the target that is perceived as more suscep-
tible to the professional’s demands for concessions. Conceding to systemic 
pressure typically results in the removal of settlement terms that could 
reasonably accommodate the target’s needs. Exhausted, targets often agree 
to unsatisfactory or unrealistic settlement terms in part to end the process 
of face-to-face meetings with the coercive partner.87
Domestic violence lawyers are most concerned that the collaborative 
setting promotes the continuation of the power imbalance and provides the 
coercive partner with greater opportunities to exercise non-physical forms 
of control.88 Any contact with the target provides the opportunity to con-
tinue the abuse and resume control.89 For example, a target might respond 
to her abuser’s ‘look’ or ‘word’ that is intended to control her. That ‘look’ or 
other signal can have many consequences, intimidating the target into making 
concessions not favourable to her. The ‘look’ can cause a reaction in the 
target that seems irrational to the mediator or other observer. Meanwhile, 
the abusing party will appear reasonable and well organised, while the target 
struggles during the session or behaves inappropriately. The abused party 
may be either non-responsive or excessively compliant during the media-
82. Pauline H Tesler, Collaborative Law: Achieving Effective Resolution in Divorce Without Litigation 
(American Bar Association 2003) 48.
83. See further, Connie JA Beck and Chitra Raghavan, ‘Intimate Partner Abuse Screening in 
Custody Mediation: The Importance of Assessing Coercive Control’ (2010) 48 Family Court Review 
555, 556-57; See also, Susan L Pollet, ‘Mediating Domestic Violence: A Potentially Dangerous Tool’ 
(2005) 77 New York State Bar Association 42, 43.
84. The term ‘neutrals’ is used here to describe those who are involved in the process but are not 
advocates for either party or the children.
85. Lydia Belzer, ‘Domestic Abuse and Divorce Mediation: Suggestions for A Safer Process’ (2003) 
5 Loyola Journal of Public International Law 37, 47.
86. See further, ibid 49-50.
87. See further, Susan L Pollet, ‘Mediating Domestic Violence: A Potentially Dangerous Tool’ 
(2005) 77 New York State Bar Association 42, 43.
88. ibid.
89. Marika Ramos, ‘Advice for abuse victims’ (Helium, 8 March 2007) <http://www.helium.com/
items/203088-advice-for-abuse-victims> accessed 25 March 2010.
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tion.90 Few mediators properly respond to this type of behaviour within the 
context of coercion.91 In fact, if the mediator’s goal is settlement rather than 
equity, the target’s compliance enhances that goal. And should that third 
party view the target’s behaviour as interfering with the settlement process, 
the target might then be labelled obstructionist.92
After over twenty years of domestic violence advocacy against the use of 
mediation, some progress has been made. Many jurisdictions have improved 
domestic abuse education requirements for mediators. Some jurisdictions 
require mediators to complete training in domestic violence if they are to be 
appointed mediators through the family court.93 A well-trained mediator 
can recognise that power and control tactics may be in play. Mediators 
sensitive to this dynamic will terminate the mediation process if the control 
tactics continue or they will refer the target to counsel for representation 
after an apparently imbalanced agreement is reached. Despite initial resist-
ance, experienced domestic violence lawyers have come to appreciate that 
certain cases may be appropriate for mediation.94 While these cases may be 
a clear minority, lawyers now concede that in some cases, mediation might 
be a valuable alternative — particularly where a client believes that ADR will 
enhance her safety. Mediation is also used in domestic violence cases where 
the mediated results are likely preferable to what a particular trier of fact 
might order. With appropriate support that ensures physical safety as well 
as safety from intimidation, a recovering trauma target can feel empowered 
during the process.95 While this scenario might be unusual, it can happen, 
and may be largely dependent upon how safe the target feels before and 
during the process and how sophisticated the mediator is in handling cases 
involving domestic abuse. A confluence of events would have to occur for 
90. See generally, Aimee Davis, ‘Mediating Cases Involving Domestic Violence: Solution or 
Setback?’ (2006) 8 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 253, 275 fn 146 (describing the various 
restrictions felt by victims).
91. See further, Megan G Thompson,  ‘Mandatory Mediation and Domestic Violence: Reformu-
lating the Good-Faith Standard’ (2007) 86 Oregon Law Review 599, 616-18.
92. This seems quite plausible in mediation given that targets are not brought to the table as equal 
participants and therefore seemingly counter-intuitive to the mediation process. See further, Davis 
(n 90) 270.
93. Some examples include: Georgia (http://www2.state.ga.us/courts/adr/adrrules.htm), Kansas 
(http://www.kscourts.org/ctruls/adrruls.htm), Michigan (http://www.supremecourt.state.mi.us/
programs/cdrp), Minnesota (http://www.courts.state.mn.us/adr/adr_info.htm), Nevada (Nevada 
Revised Statutes Annotated 38.330 (2001)), New Hampshire (http://www.state.nh.us/marital/), 
North Dakota (http://www.court.state.nd.us/Court/Rules/ndroc/Rule8.9.htm), Oregon (http://
www.odrc.state.or.us/cdrc.htm), and West Virginia (http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/familyct/cover.
htm).
94. Thompson (n 91) 600.
95. See generally, Carolyn Hoyle and Andrew Sanders, ‘Police Response to Domestic Violence: 
From Victim Choice to Victim Empowerment?’ (2000) 40 British Journal of Criminology 14, 30 
(discussing the ways in which targets can use the law as an empowerment resource).
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an abuse-sensitive mediator to be effective,96 including the drawing of clear 
behavioural boundaries around the coercive partner that are then enforced 
by the neutral, counsel, or other third parties involved with the mediation.97
Mediation can be important to a target’s safety plan. One client98 felt that 
she would be unsafe if she did not agree to her husband’s demand for me-
diation. Believing that her best safety plan was to proceed with mediation, 
she determined that after initial resistance on each item discussed, she would 
‘reluctantly’ concede to the husband’s demands permitting him to ‘win’ on 
each issue important to him. While the resulting agreement was lopsided in 
terms of asset distribution, everyone left the process satisfied. The husband 
felt that he had ‘punished’ the wife for leaving him by depriving her of assets 
that he believed she valued. The mediator, who was more concerned about 
a successful process than an equitable result, was pleased that an agreement 
was reached. The target obtained a divorce coupled with a feeling of enhanced 
safety.
The case is illustrative of the counter-intuitive nature of domestic violence 
for both litigants and attorneys. The client gave up rights to property that a 
court surely would have awarded her. The client’s priority was on her safety 
instead of what the law would have considered a fair division of property. 
Ultimately, this result would not have been possible in the collaborative 
setting. With collaborative emphasis appropriately on the transparency of 
the process,99 disclosure of the target’s plan would have undermined the 
overall values and goals of collaborative practice. The disparity in asset divi-
sion would be an obvious red flag to the experienced collaborative team, and 
team members would expect an explanation.100 The explanation, however, 
is exactly what could jeopardise the target’s safety. Preserving the integrity 
of the collaborative process would be an expected priority for the profes-
sional team in this instance, with the client’s goal of safety being secondary.
C. Target Expectations
When newly out of an abusive situation, targets of intimate partner abuse 
report that they want the abusive behaviour to stop.101 Typically, they are 
seeking reasonable solutions, not retribution. At the same time, targets can 
have an unrealistic belief that the professionals whom the parties encounter 
will be able to make the offending partner behave reasonably. This is rarely 
96. Pollet (n 87) 44.
97. See further, Thompson (n 91) 628-29.
98. This was a case in which the author represented the wife. The wife developed her mediation 
strategy as part of her safety planning.
99. Voegele (n 5) 985.
100. This is because the collaborative team’s goal is to incorporate both parties’ interests in 
reaching an equitable resolution. ibid 1018.
101. See further, Hoyle (n 95) 21.
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the case. Mediation and other forms of ADR can be an attractive alternative 
to a target because of her assumption that her voice will be respected and 
that tactics of control will be eliminated from the professional process. When 
that behavioural shift does not occur, the target becomes hopeless and more 
disempowered. Discouraged and further impoverished if she has been 
required to pay for the ADR sessions, the target may sign a marital agreement 
that does not meet her needs but accomplishes termination of the process.102
D. Mutuality and Neutrality Theories that Arise During the Settlement Process
Those involved with ADR often eliminate accountability from the process. 
Moderating language to remove blame while focusing on each party’s 
strengths can be an effective method of moving angry parties toward coop-
eration.103 As in family systems therapy, part of the mediation process contains 
both an acknowledgement that neither party has a superior position to the 
other and that each has played a role in the deterioration of the relationship. 
The process then expects both to engage in the rebuilding of trust. This 
approach of mutuality can provide a valuable reflective lesson for those 
couples not experiencing abuse. However, in relationships that are abusive, 
the focus on mutual responsibility, in particular two-party participation in 
the deterioration of the relationship, undermines the benefits of the process 
for the target and makes her more unsafe.104 In situations where a coercive 
partner’s tactics of control can be contained only through accountability, 
focusing any blame on the target only serves to empower the coercive 
partner.105 Not only is the coercive partner not held accountable for his actions, 
but focus is shifted to the target in a way that accommodates the coercive 
partner’s position.
Mutuality, which diminishes the target’s claims, is commonly employed 
throughout the family legal system. Family court implementation of the 
mutuality approach has been well documented.106 The practice is even more 
consciously employed in mediation and other ADR practices. One theory of 
mediation is that neither party should be ‘blamed’ in the ADR setting.107 This 
practice carries over to the collaborative setting and is appropriate in cases 
not involving domestic abuse. Once an accusation is made, the mediator 
achieves ‘balance’ through mutuality. In order to achieve mutuality in both 
102. See further, Sarah Krieger, ‘The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases’ (2002) 
8 Cardozo Women’s Law Journal 235, 247-48.
103. Nancy Ver Steegh, ‘Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce Media-
tion in the Presence of Domestic Violence’ (2003) 9 William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 
(2003) 145, 186-88.
104. Davis (n 90) 270-71. 
105. Pollet (n 87) 43. 
106. Meier (n 2) 694-98.
107. ibid 693.
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courtroom and ADR settings, the target’s minor insult or other responsive 
behaviour is given parity with the coercive partner’s beating, sexual abuse, 
and sustained verbal or emotional assault.108
Targets often display behaviour in court that negatively affects their 
credibility.109 Coercive partners do not. They actually deny or minimise the 
effect of their actions.110 Consequently, the mediator might hear only about 
the target’s misbehaviour. If the target feels that it is not safe to disclose 
abuse, particularly sexual assault, the mediator will not be aware of prior 
traumatising events. This can lead to inaccurate conclusions, such that the 
couple is immature or simply in ‘high conflict’.111 In fact, domestic abuse 
cases are often confused with ‘high conflict’ cases, where mutuality of inap-
propriate behaviour is foundational.112 Targets’ claims can go unheard and 
unaddressed when the case is labelled as ‘high conflict’. A careful review of 
‘high conflict’ cases by those educated in domestic abuse reveals that many, 
if not most, are mislabelled. When professionals do not understand a target’s 
response to abuse, her inappropriate behaviour is seen as ‘mutual’.113 In 
actuality, many cases labelled ‘high conflict’ — because both parties are 
assessed with inappropriate behaviour — are actually abuse cases114 involv-
ing a predominate aggressor. 
Under non-coercive circumstances, one benefit that the collaborative 
process offers is the opportunity for the participants and the larger family 
to heal. When practiced sensitively and empathetically, that goal may be 
accomplished for perhaps one, or even both, of the former intimate partners.115 
In theory, the collaborative process could benefit a target since healing is 
sometimes best accomplished through public disclosure of the coercive 
partner’s abuse.116 However, the potential for the collaborative process to 
provide this benefit for the target is limited. The lawyer or other profes-
sional who undertakes mediation or collaborative practice, knowing that a 
108. ibid 690-92.
109. ibid 691.
110. ibid 690.
111. See further, Davis (n 90) 296-70 (noting that most mediation screeners are not trained to 
recognise abuse).
112. See further, Clare Dalton, Judge Susan Carbon, and Nancy Oleson, ‘High Conflict Divorce, 
Violence, and Abuse: Implications for Custody and Visitation Decisions’ (2003) 54(4) Juvenile and 
Family Court Journal 11, 13-14. The term ‘high conflict’ often refers to couples who seemingly agree 
on nothing and argue about everything. They may involve their children in their conflicts. This 
definition can mask abusive relationships and be problematic for those experiencing intimate partner 
abuse.
113. cf Goodmark (n 49) 107-08 (describing this theory in the context of abuse in lesbian relation-
ships).
114. Dalton, ‘High Conflict Divorce, Violence, and Abuse: Implications for Custody and Visitation 
Decisions’ (n 112) 23-24.
115. Voegele (n 5) 999-1000.
116. Orloff (n 20) 65.
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client will be discouraged from disclosing details of abuse, may interfere 
with and prevent the target’s healing.117 Likewise, when the collaborative 
setting is promoted as ‘safe’,118 the target may assume that she will be free 
from coercion and retaliation. The ADR professional, however, will likely 
focus on physical safety and the target will not understand that the profes-
sional is unable to control the coercive behaviour that is likely to occur during 
and after the ADR sessions.
Collaborative and other ADR professionals often fail to acknowledge the 
coercive partner’s harm to the target and the family. The process does not 
acknowledge that the target did not deserve what happened, let alone 
acknowledge that the target did not create the abusive situation. If focus is 
on avoiding blame, and witness is not given to the coercive conduct, the lack 
of voiced support could be devastating for a target. ADR practitioners may 
view the lack of their voiced support as maintaining ‘neutrality’.119 But, the 
lack of acknowledgement that abuse occurred, combined with the lack of 
consequences for the coercive partner, can have devastating mental health 
consequences for the target, and can make her less safe.120
On the other hand, if detailed disclosure is made, the professionals then 
must assess whether and how compensation will be made to the target, if 
compensation is sought. These are situations that may be uncomfortable 
for most family law practitioners, if not beyond their expertise. For these 
and additional reasons, abuse cases may not be appropriate for the collabo-
rative process unless the legal team is expanded to include tort specialists 
who can assist in determining compensation, but that is not within the proper 
‘limited service engagement’ contemplated in the collaborative law arena.121 
Since the collaborative process focuses on the couple’s moving forward, 
rather than compensation for suffering, the inclusion of tort compensation 
as part of the settlement discussion can be viewed as both hostile and det-
rimental to the process.
E. The Belief that Collaborative Practice is the Best Approach in All Family 
Law Cases
By the year 2000, collaborative practice was making an impact in many 
jurisdictions.122 Some proponents were convinced that litigation in family 
117. Goodmark (n 49) 108-09 (referring to Barbara Hart, ‘Lesbian Battering: An Examination’ 
in Kerry Lobel (ed), Naming the Violence: Speaking Out About Lesbian Battering (Seal Press 1986) 173, 
186).
118. Voegele (n 5) 980.
119. See further, Davis (n 90) 264.
120. In most settings, the target has some safety risks associated with disclosing abuse. A judicial 
finding that abuse did not occur can increase the target’s safety risk. Any minimisation by a third 
party of abusive behaviour endangers the target by empowering the abuser.
121. Voegele (n 5) 1012.
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law cases is never appropriate.123 Promoters gave little regard to cases in 
which domestic violence was alleged.124 As the practice expanded, the discus-
sion became more inclusive and practitioners began recognising that some 
cases, like those involving addiction or abuse, were most likely not appropri-
ate for collaborative law.125 Others acknowledged safety concerns, but felt 
that the process could provide a physically safe space.126 Nonetheless, many 
professionals still believe that most cases are appropriate for the collabora-
tive process.127
Rarely does one size fit all in any process. Even though the collaborative 
process can be an effective and holistic experience for many separated 
partners, it is not the best method for all situations. It is particularly helpful 
when practiced with empathy and a view toward the client’s recovery from 
trauma.128 But when the practitioner is of the belief that collaborative law is 
always the superior process in family law cases, the rigidity of that view can 
disregard the needs of abuse targets.
Even though collaborative practice is but one choice of methods that a 
client has in resolving intimate partner and other family disputes, the pres-
entation of the choices might be skewed in favour of one process over another. 
For example, one leading proponent of collaborative law has greatly dis-
counted litigation in family law matters so as to preclude any consideration 
of when litigation may be appropriate and necessary.129 This presumption 
will lead to cases being forced into an inappropriate process. Neutral assess-
ment of resolution options is important — particularly since no one system 
provides a significantly greater likelihood of settlement.130
The many benefits of collaborative law can and should be explained by 
practitioners without unfairly discounting or disrespecting the benefits of 
other forms of resolution, including the litigation model. The legal process 
can add many layers of stress and frustration to the client’s already disturbed 
existence. If the collaborative process fails, the legal system might be able 
122. Tesler, ‘Collaborative Family Law’ (n 3) 317-18.
123. See further, Leah J Pollema, ‘Beyond the Bounds of Zealous Advocacy: The Prevalence of 
Abusive Litigation in Family Law and the Need for Tort Remedies’ (2007) 75 University of Missouri 
at Kansas City Law Review 1107, 1113.
124. See generally, Voegele (n 5) 1012 (referring to Tesler, Collaborative Law: Achieving Effective 
Resolution in Divorce Without Litigation (n 82) 94-95 and noting that abuse cases are likely not ap-
propriate for the collaborative process).
125. ibid; See also, Susan M Buckholz, ‘Two Views on Collaborative Law: Collaborative Dissolu-
tion’ (2004) 30 Vermont Bar Journal 37, 37.
126. Voegele (n 5) 980.
127. Tesler, Collaborative Law: Achieving Effective Resolution in Divorce Without Litigation (n 82) 
179.
128. Voegele (n 5) 1000-01.
129. Tesler, ‘Collaborative Family Law’ (n 3) 317.
130. See example, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of its 
Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals’ (2007) 44 UCLA Law Review 1871, 1923-25.
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to provide protection and produce results that were not available during the 
collaborative process.131 Sometimes participants do not take settlement 
discussions seriously until trial is imminent and only then will they appreci-
ate the weaknesses of their positions or the risk in leaving the decision in 
the hands of a third party. Other times, because of the extreme unreasona-
bleness of one or both of the parties, negotiations on any level simply fail.
Holistic approaches to healing can be found in any resolution process. 
Litigation, mediation, and collaborative practice offer opportunities for 
professionals to assist clients in becoming stronger and more accepting of 
the outcome. The ability to help a client heal depends upon the quality of 
the professional and is not tied to the process. Of course, we all wish that 
every dispute could be resolved in an amicable and respectful manner. The 
reality is that this is simply not possible in every dispute. If a practitioner is 
tied to one form of resolution, particularly if that practitioner is unable to 
give a neutral assessment or description of the other processes, the integ-
rity of whatever system the client selects has already been compromised.132
When practitioners believe that the collaborative process is fundamen-
tally superior and can be applied to all family law cases, they will have a 
natural resistance to terminating the process, even after it has become 
apparent that settlement is not likely. Commentators are fond of saying that 
the restriction on the collaborative lawyer from representing the client in 
any related litigation keeps the lawyers at the table longer and releases their 
creativity.133 That may be so in some cases, but when the process is not func-
tioning, the lawyers ought to leave the table. Staying creates further financial 
and other hardships for the parties. Even where one party is exhibiting 
controlling behaviour over the other that is unrecognised or inappropri-
ately assessed by the professionals, the negotiations may continue because 
of the collaborative team’s resistance to terminating the process.134 In equat-
ing termination with ‘failure’, the team will continue with the process as long 
as possible. If one views the collaborative process simply as one possible 
method of resolution, and the professional ego is detached from judgement 
of litigation or mediation, then the collaborative process will terminate 
timely, freeing the parties to move on to the next method of possible resolu-
tion.
There are multiple reasons for professionals to promptly terminate a 
failing process. Of primary concern for the professionals is avoiding the 
appearance of extending the process solely to increase revenue. Profession-
131. See example, Ohio Revised Code Annotated    3113.31 (n 24) (providing that ‘the court may 
grant any protection order ... or approve any consent agreement to bring about a cessation of do-
mestic violence against the family or household members’).
132. See generally, Krieger (n 102) 253 (discussing the importance of screening for abuse in me-
diation settings).
133. Voegele (n 5) 979-80. 
134. ibid 980.
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als who contractually agree not to participate in related litigation may be 
perceived as continuing the process for financial gain.135
While collaborative law often provides a helpful and meaningful service, 
professionals must be mindful ‘not to oversell any given process, including 
Collaborative Law’.136 Many collaborative lawyers are former family law 
litigators. Disenfranchised by increasing incivility and other difficulties 
encountered in family law litigation practice, many have chosen instead to 
embrace collaborative practice. The system is more comfortable for them 
to learn because the lawyers continue to represent clients in a somewhat 
traditional format. Unlike mediation where the lawyer must adjust practice 
from advocacy to neutrality, the collaborative lawyer must learn only to work 
as a ‘team’ member and modify language from a blaming vocabulary to a 
more holistic one. The support of other team members makes the transition 
easier because of the mentoring that more experienced team members 
provide. Once the transition is made, the collaborative lawyer fears reverting 
back to a full-time litigation practice. The impetus for the model to succeed 
at all costs can motivate the lawyer to continue the collaborative process 
even when the parties are no longer benefitting from the process. This fear 
contributes to the lawyer’s initial resistance to recommending litigation as 
a necessary process for appropriate cases. 
v. the risks of applying the collaborative model to abuse cases
All of the concerns noted regarding cases involving intimate partner abuse 
entering into the mediation process are present in the collaborative law 
arena. In addition, several aspects of the collaborative model that make the 
process a rich experience in non-abusive situations can be the very aspects 
of the process that increase risk for the coercively controlled target.
A. Disclosure and Transparency
Coercive partners are rarely honest with their targets.137 Financial control, 
secrecy, and fraud are generally present in abusive relationships.138 Without 
safeguards or sanctions for failing to make accurate disclosures, there is little 
135. Clients are often told that the collaborative process will be less expensive than litigation. 
However, the client will have separate fee agreements with each member of the collaborative team. 
Tesler, ‘Collaborative Family Law’ (n 3) 331. The same claim is often made of mediation. Pollet (n 87) 
43. This has not proven true in abuse cases where subsequent litigation is likely because the controlling 
party has not obtained every term he feels entitled to. Often the coercive partner will not abide by the 
mediation and the parties will just keep returning to court, adding more costs to the target. Zorza, 
‘What is Wrong with Mediation’ (n 68) 94.
136. Voegele (n 5) 1012.
137. See generally, Wolf-Smith (n 55) 325 (noting that coercive partners will often apologise and 
make empty promises of changed behaviour, only to continue abusive behaviour).
138. See generally, Bellew (n 62) (describing the various forms of abuse that can be employed).
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incentive for coercive partners who have hidden assets to be honest during 
the collaborative process.139 Without formal discovery procedures,140 there 
is no subpoena process for verification of client-provided information.
In fact, some non-financial disclosures could be made that jeopardise the 
well-being of the targeted partner.141 For example, whether the target is in a 
new relationship is often irrelevant to settlement discussions. Obtaining this 
information can be a focus of coercive partners who use many tools, includ-
ing litigation and settlement processes, to discover the whereabouts and 
activities of their partners.142 If there is to be transparency and full disclosure, 
the collaborative model requires that no information may be withheld.143 
Disclosure of a target’s address, whereabouts, and status of any new relation-
ship could place both the target and any new partner at serious risk of harm.144 
The types of information that can place a client at risk are particular to each 
individual situation. Transparency may be an achievable goal in situations 
where the couples have a history of good faith interactions. When couples 
have experienced abuse in an intimate relationship, it can be presumed that 
one or both parties will lack the good faith and/or respect components es-
sential to successful collaboration.
B. Four-Way Meetings
An important part of the collaborative process is the use of frequent face-
to-face meetings, often called ‘four-way’ meetings.145 This contact with the 
coercive partner can be traumatising for targets, particularly during the early 
stages of separation and recovery. In fact, divorce and custody proceedings 
can be a conduit for prolonging the effects of traumatising events.146 This 
trauma is compounded for those who have been sexually assaulted, stalked, 
and emotionally or verbally abused by the former partner. Post-traumatic 
stress disorder, depression, and other mental health concerns can be found 
in some individuals who have been abused.147 Many family law lawyers 
139. cf Bancroft (n 41) 179 (discussing how the batterer will often only be honest and upfront in 
negotiations when either threatened with losing contact with their children or as a means of trying 
to reconcile with the target).
140. See further, Reynolds (n 69) 12, 14.
141. Zorza, ‘Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of Battered 
Women’ (n 81) 290-91.
142. Pollema (n 123) 1110. 
143. Gutterman (n 16) 57.
144. Pauline Quirion, ‘Representing Victims of Domestic Violence’ in Phyllis E Federico and 
Peter F Zupcofska (eds), Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual (2nd edn, Massachusetts Con-
tinuing Legal Education 2008) ch 25, para 25-9-11.
145. Voegele (n 5) 984.
146. See generally, Pollema (n 123) 1110 (noting how coercive partners can use the legal system 
as an instrument to perpetuate abuse).
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comprehend why a victim of stranger rape would be discouraged from fre-
quent meetings with the perpetrator.148 Yet when the assailant is an intimate 
partner, particularly where the parties have children, the target is often 
encouraged to participate in face-to-face meetings without regard for the 
impact those meetings may have on her sense of safety and her mental 
health.149 
Even those who have not been physically or sexually abused but have 
been otherwise coercively controlled are usually not prepared for the emo-
tional impact of face-to-face meetings. While the meetings, at the right point 
in recovery, may have some therapeutic value, the lawyers, coaches, and 
others involved with the clients are not qualified to predict whether the 
meetings will be re-traumatising or assistive in recovery.
The most dangerous time for targets of domestic abuse is the time period 
during and after separation.150 The coercive partner’s concept of ‘leaving’ 
varies, and is defined by his perception of events.151 For example, the target 
obtaining a job or applying for school may be perceived by the coercive 
partner as an attempt to leave, even though the at-risk partner may have no 
such plans. The perceived loss of control and the coercive partner’s inter-
pretation of the target’s actions are what trigger the heightened danger, not 
the intention of the controlled party.
The danger associated with leaving can continue for some time following 
separation.152 Any contact with the target during this period increases the 
opportunity for a coercive partner to inflict further harm, whether that harm 
is physical, emotional, or psychological.153 This is why the ‘no contact’ or ‘stay 
away’ provisions of civil protection orders are the most important terms for 
ensuring target safety.
Similarly, threats can be delivered in ways not understood other than by 
the target. A settlement offer where the coercive partner insists on taking 
the family dog could be a threat known only to the partner. The coercive 
partner might have abused the family dog. Delivering this demand in a face-
to-face meeting could have a powerful effect on the at-risk partner.
147. Ann Coker and others, ‘Physical and Mental Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence for 
Men and Women’ (2002) 23 American Journal of Preventive Medicine 260, 265.
148. Zorza, ‘Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of Battered 
Women’ (n 81) 295-96.
149. See further, Bancroft (n 41) 185-87.
150. Lorena Garcia, Catalina Soria, and Eric L Hurwitz, ‘Homicides and Intimate Partner Violence: 
A Literature Review’ (2007) 8 Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 370, 374-75.
151. Cathy Humphreys and Ravi K Thiara, ‘Neither Justice Nor Protection: Women’s Experi-
ences of Post-Separation Violence’ (2003) 25 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 195, 198.
152. ibid 199. 
153. ibid 199-200.
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vi. ethical issues
The ethical issues that are raised by involving abused partners in the col-
laborative process are both in addition to, and different from, the issues 
raised by collaborative law practice generally.154 Among the ethical issues 
raised by collaborative law are the financial ability to hire successor counsel, 
the timing of the process, emotional exhaustion, and the handling of a target’s 
often unrealistic expectation regarding the outcome of the process.
A. Finances and the Ability to Hire Counsel
Financial abuse is often present in coercive relationships.155 Money is a 
powerful tool of control. Even if the family unit has substantial assets, the 
at-risk partner typically does not have access to those resources without the 
permission of the coercive partner.156 Targets who are working professionals 
and earn a significant salary report that they cannot independently access 
funds. Asserting independent financial control could invite further abuse. 
When the target does have access to funds, she often must account to her 
coercive partner for each penny spent.157
Consequently, targets rarely have sufficient resources to hire competent 
counsel during the divorce process, let alone enough money to engage in 
alternative processes that might not be successful.158 When targets do have 
funds for a retainer, often those funds are limited.159 Most targets will not 
have sufficient funds to hire successor counsel if the collaborative process 
is terminated before resolution.160 This is a valid concern. The divorce process 
is expensive and if the collaborative process is terminated without resolution, 
targets may have substantial difficulty in hiring competent counsel to rep-
resent them during divorce and custody litigation. Many targets who find 
the collaborative process unsuccessful may need to proceed with divorce 
and custody litigation pro se.161 This is an especially dangerous practice for 
abused mothers.162
154. Scott R Peppet, ‘Ethical Issues of Collaborative Law’ [2008] Journal of Dispute Resolution 
131, 157.
155. Bellew (n 62) 42-43.
156. ibid 42.
157. ibid.
158. Lisa E Martin, ‘Providing Equal Justice for the Domestic Violence Victim: Due Process and 
the Victim’s Right to Counsel’ (1999) 34 Gonzaga Law Review 329, 344.
159. See generally, Sarah M Buel, ‘Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay’ 
(1999) 28(10) The Colorado Lawyer 19, 20 (discussing the financial hardship faced by targets).
160. Martin (n 158) 344.
161. ibid 331.
162. See generally, Mary A Kernic and others,  ‘Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody Deter-
minations Among Couples With a History of Intimate Partner Violence’ (2005) 11 Violence Against 
Women 991, 995 (describing how ‘the psychological aftermath of abuse’ could even ‘lead to the 
appearance that the batterer will make a more fit parent than the victim’).
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Compounding this concern is the difficulty that targets have in finding 
counsel who understands the dynamics of domestic violence.163 A target that 
enters the collaborative process in good faith might want the same lawyer 
to represent her during subsequent litigation. Indeed, collaborative counsel 
could be the most competent domestic violence lawyer in the client’s geo-
graphic area. Ethically, before recommending the collaborative process, the 
professionals should ensure that clients have sufficient funds to hire com-
petent successor counsel. Otherwise, clients may be left with little choice 
but to enter into an agreement with unfavourable terms because they cannot 
afford to engage other methods of resolution.
B. Timing and Expectations
Before taking part in any settlement process, the target may need significant 
time away from the controlling partner in order to recover self-confidence. 
Traumatised targets may have difficulty organising their thoughts and re-
sponding appropriately to inquiries.164 Without sufficient time for recovery, 
the target may have unrealistic expectations for the outcome of the legal 
process. Those who have experienced abuse are eager for the abuse to stop165 
and will often feel that the professionals have the power to change the co-
ercive partner’s behaviour. This expectation is unrealistic because coercive 
partners rarely change behaviour post-separation.166 Collaborative profes-
sionals are unable to enforce consequences for the controlling behaviour, 
other than termination of the collaborative process itself. Eager to begin the 
collaborative process early in the client’s separation, the professionals are 
unable to enforce boundaries. There is no incentive for many coercive part-
ners to contain or change behaviour.167 The unreasonableness of the coercive 
partner’s positions, and the continued use of controlling tactics, can bring 
a sense of reality to the target.168 Only with sufficient recovery time, however, 
will the targeted partner be able to understand and accept the limitations of 
any ADR process in changing or controlling abusive behaviour.
When expectation of changed behaviour is no longer part of the client’s 
decision-making process, the partner who has experienced abuse can make 
more detached decisions about her future and the terms of separation.
163. See generally, Martin (n 158) 354-55 (discussing the various daunting aspects of litigation for a 
target of domestic violence).
164. Lewis Herman (n 46) 93-95.
165. cf Hoyle (n 95) 155 (noting that targets who call the police are often times more interested in 
ending their abuse than in punishing their partners).
166. Quirion (n 144) para 25-7.
167. cf Bancroft (n 41) 185 (discussing other forms of motivation for batterers to change their be-
haviour, apart from sanctions).
168. ibid 5.
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However, the collaborative process often commences shortly after the 
parties separate.169 This is not only a very dangerous time for the target, but 
it is also a time when she may not be sufficiently separated from the coercive 
partner to appreciate the extent to which she was abused.170 She may not 
realise how the abuse changed her personality and behaviour. While the 
client is in a traumatised state, she is not as likely to make appropriate deci-
sions on issues that will affect her and her children for years into the future. 
In fact, the target may not even be able to recall details of traumatising events 
early after separation.
C. Emotional Exhaustion
Those who have been controlled in intimate relationships may come to the 
professionals in an exhausted state.171 The traumatised client needs support 
and empowerment to heal.172 If the collaborative team is not focused on 
supporting the traumatised client and postponing negotiations until the 
client has made substantial recovery, the collaborative process is not an 
appropriate remedy. If controlling tactics continue post-separation, which 
is the case in most coercive control situations, the process is not going to 
support healing for either party. The controlling partner will be empowered 
by the process to continue his control.173 The coercive partner’s controlling 
tactics may be difficult for the collaborative team to recognise as they may 
be peculiar to the particular target.174 For example, pet abuse is a common 
tactic of control in abusive relationships. As mentioned earlier, in some cases, 
coercive partners insist on continued control of a pet as part of settlement 
in an effort to send a message to the abused partner that she had better do 
what the partner wants or the pet will be abused. The same tactic can be 
used for anything or anyone that the target values. This is why threats to take 
the children are particularly powerful.
If the target is exposed to threats throughout the collaborative process, 
she will give up on the process, disappointed that the coercive partner was 
not contained.175 As previously noted, this attitude leads to settlement on 
unsatisfactory terms.176 For those concerned about malpractice, the arrange-
ment is fraught with possibilities of later claims.177 Releases and waivers may 
be unenforceable when signed by someone who is in a traumatised state.178
169. See further, Peppet (n 154) 133-34.
170. Lewis Herman (n 46) 158.
171. See generally, ibid 134-35 (enumerating the mental state of an abuse target when they enter 
into therapy). 
172. ibid 133.
173. See further, Bancroft (n 41) 113-29.
174. ibid 79.
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vii. conclusion
While family law practitioners nobly search for ways to minimise the angst 
of separation and divorce, few acknowledge their role in exacerbating their 
clients’ trauma. Collaborative practitioners must consider the risk to engag-
ing abused partners in their practice. Collaboration works best with clients 
who can be respectful and honest with each other. Those characteristics are 
not compatible with abusive relationships.
175. See generally, Buel, ‘Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay’ (n 159) 22 
(noting that mediation can also leave the target feeling disappointed that the coercive partner was 
not controlled).
176. Bancroft (n 41) 117, 125.
177. See generally, Margaret Drew, ‘Lawyer Malpractice and Domestic Violence: Are We Revic-
timizing our Clients?’ (2005) 39 Family Law Quarterly 7, 12-20 (identifying some of the possible 
claims that the client may later bring. For example, the client could claim that the lawyer recom-
mended the collaborative process without appreciation of how traumatising it would be for the 
client to be exposed to her abuser).
178. For example, in an Ohio case the Court upheld a finding that a separation agreement was 
signed under duress where the husband made threats to his wife and there had been repeated acts 
of abuse during marriage. Quebodeaux v Quebodeaux 657 NE2d 539, 541 (Ohio Ct App 1995); In a 
South Carolina case, the Court upheld the trial court’s finding that a separation agreement resulted 
from undue influence where the wife was beaten by her husband and subjected to constant mental 
abuse. Jackson v Jackson 310 SE2d 827, 828 (South Carolina Ct App 1983).
